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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION-WHAT CONSTITUTES.-HARBY v. HEUMES, 90
N. Y. SuPP. 46t.-Held, that the acceptance by the creditor of a check from
the debtor, written as "in full payment," with immediate notice to the debtor
that action would be brought for the balance claimed, is not an accord and
satisfaction.
The general rule is that there can be no accord and satisfaction of a debt
by a simple payment of a smaller sum than the amount actually due or owing,
unless there be a release under seal, Cumfier v. Wane, z Strange 426; or a
new consideration. U. S. vz. Bostwick, 94 U. S. 53. The rule and reason
are purely technical, and there is constant effort to escape from its absurdity
and injustice. Harfier v,. Graham, 20 Ohio zos; Brooks z. White, 2 Met.
285; and it does not hold in Pennsylvania; Milliken v. Brown, I Rawle 391.
A receipt "in full satisfaction and discharge" is not conclusive evidence of
accord and satisfaction, McCullen v. Hood, I4 N. C. 2r9; unless the debt be
unliquidated and the amount uncertain, Baird v. United States, 96 U. S.
430; and payment was in fact made and accepted in satisfaction. Fitch V.
Sutton, 5 East 230. If there be a controversy between the parties as to the
amount due, and the debtor tender the amount which he claims to be due, but
upon condition that it shall be accepted in discharge, and it be accepted, then
there is accord and satisfaction by conclusion of law, on the principle that one
accepting a conditional tender assents to the condition. Preston V. Grant,
3 4 Vt. 201; Bull v. Bull, 43 Conn. 455; Reed v. Boardman, 2o Pick. 441.
CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-SEAWORTHINESS OF VESSEL-LIAILITY FOR
INJUEIE.-THR OREGON, 133 FED. 6o9.- Held, that there is no implied war-
ranty, on the part of a carrier of passengers by sea, of the seaworthiness of
the vessel. Ross, J., dissenting.
Carriers of passengers by sea are held to the same high degree of care as
those who carry by land. Hall v. Steamboat Co., 13 Conn. 3i9; Shear. &'
Red., Neg., 495. A carrier by land need not furnish a "roadworthy" vehicle.
Stokes v. Ry. Co., 2 Fost. & F. 691; Meier v. R. Co., 64 Pa. St. 225. Nor
need the carrier by sea furnish a seaworthy ship. Carroll v. R. Co., 58 N.Y.
126; Whart., Neg., Sec. 638. But an accident through a defect is jirima
facie evidence of negligence. Dawson v'. .R. Co., 5 Law Times, N. S., 682.
U. S. statutes make certain requirements of the owners of passenger vessels.
xo Slat. at L. 6; I6 Stat. at L. 44o. But these do not abrogate the common
law rules as to liability. Caldwell v. Steamboat Co., 47 N. Y. 282.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INSURANCE CORPORATIoNS-REVOCATION OF AUTHOR-
ITY.-PREWITT V. SECURITY M. L. INS. CO., 83 S. W. 6ni; 84 S. W. 527 (Ky.).-
Where a state statute provides that if any foreign insurance company, with-
out consent of the other party to a suit brought by or against it in any state
,court, shall remove the suit to the federal court, the insurance commissioner
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shall forthwith revoke its authority to do business in the-state, held, that such
statute is not in conflict with the U. S. Constitution, it being a reasonable
regulation for the protection of the citizens of the state. Burnam, C. J., and
Barker, J., dissenting.
A state can exclude a foreign corporation entirely from its limits. Bank
of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519. A fortiori it would seem that such
absolute power would necessarily include the power to impose any conditions
as terms of entrance, no matter how absurd, or oppressive. But such terms,
conditions, or restrictions, must not be repugnant to the Constitution or the
laws of the United States, Runyan v. Costar, 14 Pet. 12s; Del. R.R. Tar
Case, 18 Wall. 206; Cable v. Ins. Co. 19r U. S. 288; and astate statute impos-
ing on a foreign corporation, as a condition on which it may do business
within the state, that it file an agreement not to remove suits from state
courts to courts of the United States, as well as such agreement, is void-
Nute v. Ins. Co., 6 Gray x74; So. Pac. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202; Tex.
Land Co. v. Worsham, 76 Tex. 556. Such right of removal may of course be
waived, but it may not be bartered away in advance. But when once within
a state, the foreign corporation is there on sufferance only; hence, though the
statute forbidding removal of causes, and a like agreement in advance, may
be void, if the corporation will not abide by them, the state may recall its
license and expel the corporation; and its reason for so doing will not be
inquired into. Beale, For. Corfi., § 122; Doyle v. Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535;
Cable v. Ins. Co., sutpra.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-ORIGINAL PACKAGE.-
COOK V. MARSHALL COUNTY, 25 SUP. CT. 23 3.-Held, that cigarettes shipped
in small packages, ten in a package, although shipped separately and not
confined in any large receptacle, are not to be considered as in the original
package so as to be exempt from a state tax. Fuller, C. J., Brewer, and Peck-
ham, JJ., dissenting.
Up to the decision of Austin v. Tennessee, 79 U. S. 343, it was supposed
that any package in which an article was shipped into a state was the original
package. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 41 9 . In Leisy v. Hardin, r35
U. S. 1oo, kegs and cases of beer were original packages, and likewise ten
pound packages of oleomargarine in Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 17r U.
S. x. In Austin v. Tennessee, sulira, however, the test was held to be the
bonafide intention of the shipper, as to whether the packages were gotten up
merely for the purpose of evading the law. They are original packages only
when they are such as are ordinarily used for the purpose of shipping that
article. In that case, as in the present one, there was a strong dissenting
opinion based on the ground that the original packages are what the shipper
makes them for his own purposes even though they may be different from
those in ordinary use. It is conceived that under the present decision the lar
must change with the change in the ordinary method of transportation.
CONTRACTS-EXECUTORY-REFUSAL TO PERFORM.-SwIGER v. HAYMAN, 48
S. E. 839 (W. VA.).-Held, that a mere declaration, by one of the parties to,
an executory contract, of an intention not to perform, which is retracted be-
fore any declaration has been made or act done by the other party in res-
pect to such renunciation, does not constitute a breach of the coutract.
Words or conduct relied on as a breach of the contract by anticipation
must amount to a total refusal to perform, acted upon and adopted by the
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other party. Kadish v. Young, xo8 Ill. 170; Johnston v. Milling, 16 Q. B
D. 46o. The act must be of such a nature as necessarily to prevent the other
party from performing, on his part, according to the terms of the agreement.
.Dubois v. Canal CO., 4 Wend. 284. But a refusal to make a certain payment
under a contract because of a dispute as to whether it is due will not authorize
the other party to rescind. Winchester v. Newton, 2 Allen 492. The refusal
to perform must be acted upon promptly or within a reasonable time.
Holbrook v. Burt, 22 Pick. 546; Kingsley v. Wallis, x4 Me. 57- When one
party gives notice of intention to abandon the contract the other party may
bring an action before the day set for the completion of the contract arrives.
Follansbee v. Adams, 86 Ill. 13.
CONTRACTS-FRAUDULENT BREACH-EXEMPLARY DAMAGEs.-WILBORN V.
DIXON, 49 S. E. 232 (S. C.).-Held, that where land is conveyed to secure a
debt, with an agreement for reconveyance, and on payment the grantor
fraudulently refuses to reconvey, he may be made to respond in exemplary as
well as compensatory damages. Woods, J., dissenting.
There seems to be no authority in support of this case. Exemplary dam-
ages may be allowed for a breach of a promise to marry if defendant has been
guilty of fraud, deceit, or evil motive, Jacoby v. Stark, 205 Ill. 34; also in an
action on bond of plaintiff in garnishment, where it appears that the process
of garnishment was vexatious, Hays v. Anderson, 57 Ala. 374. In no other
cases are such damages recoverable for mere breach of contract, Houston & T.
C. Ry. Co. v. Shirley, 54 Tex. 125; not even if it be a refusal to pay money
due and a conversion thereof with intent to oppress, Lexington Ry, Co. v.
Pair, 25 Ky. L. R. 2243; nor where the motive for the breach is fraudulent,
Sutherland Dam., (2nd ed.), Sec. 99; it would greatly increase the intricacy
and uncertainty of such actions. Houston &- T. C. Ry. Co. v'. Shirley, suj~ra.
In case of breach through negligence or fraud, no more can be recovered as
damages than will fully indemify the plaintiff for losses. Ryder v. Thayer,
3 La. Ann. 149.
CORPORATION-COMPENSATION OF PRESIDENT-IMPLIED CONTRACT.-LowE
v. RING, io N. W, 693. (Ws.).-Held, that the president of a corporation
cannot sue on an implied contract to enforce a claim for services rendered as
such officer and with the expectation of pay, where he is a stockholder or
director.
It has been held that the president of a corporation may recover com-
pensation for services rendered with expectation of pay, although there is no
express contract to that effect. Rosborough v. Shasta R. C. Co., 22 Cal. 557;
that he may recover what his services are reasonably worth, Nat. Loan Co.
v. Rockland Co.. 94 Fed. 335, and that nothwithstanding the fact that he is a
stockholder or director. Stacy v. Cherokee Jlf. & M Works, 49 S. E. 223.
On the other hand, and, it seems, by the weight of authority, in the absence of
an express contract, or an express provision for compensation in the charter,
statute, or by-laws, the services are presumed to have been rendered
gratuitously. Barril v. Col. Insul. &.- Water Proof Co., 5o Hun 257; and
the president cannot recover on an implied contract when the services
rendered were in performance of his official duties. Beach, Priv. Corfi., Sec.
2o8. The rule is analogous to that governing trustees generally, who,
formerly at common law, were not entitled to compensation except as there
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was warrant therefor in the contract or statute under which they acted.
Ellis v. Ward, 137 Ill. 5og. But the tendency now is to give trustees or
other fiduciaries a reasonable compensation for services, without an express
contract. Bispham, Equity, Sec. z44.
CRIMINAL LAw-CoNCURRENT JURISDICTION-FRAUDULENT AssUMPTION OF
JURISDICTION.--HARGIS ET AL. V. PARKER, JUDGE, ET. AL., 85 S. W. 704 (KY.).--
A mortal wound was inflicted on decedent in one country and he died in an-
other. This, under a state statute, gave the courts of either county juris-
diction to prosecute the offence. The persons accused of the crime fraudu-
lently instigated the commencement of criminal proceedings against them-
selves in the former county. A magistrate of that county issued a warrant
for their arrest, and bound them over to the circuit court of that county. These
steps were taken with a view not to have a trial there, and to prevent a trial
elsewhere. Held, that the circuit court of the County in which decedent died,
on subsequently indicting such persons for the offence, had exclusive juris-
diction thereof, the proceedings before the magistrate in the county in which the
mortal wound was inflicted being a nullity.
The rule that, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the court that first gets
control of the subject matter will continue to exercise exclusive jurisdiction
until judgment, is applicable to criminal cases. United States v. Wells.
Fed. Cas. No. i6, 665. The court first obtaining jurisdiction will retain it, to
the exclusion of the other court or county. Ex 4arte Baldwin, 69 Iowa 5o2:
State v. Williford, 91 N. C. 529; State v. Pauley, 12 Wis. 537. But fraud
vitiates every proceeding, where proof of fraud is admissible. Greene v.
Greene, 2 Gray 36r. Judgment, procured through fraud, in a civil action, can-
always beset aside. Ocean Ins. Co. v. Fields, 2 Story 59; Freeman, judg-
ments. See. 489-491; Edson z. Edson, io8 Mass. 59o.
CRIMINAL LAw-SuccEsszvz OFFENSES-DOUBLE PUNiSHMENT.-PEOPLZ V.
COLEMAN, 79 PAC. 283 (CAL.). -Held, that an increase in the penalty on sub-
sequent convictions of the same person for crime does not subject the accused
to double jeopardy for his first offense.
The danger that prejudice of the jury may make such statutes a means of
double punishment is illustrated by the remark of the court, arguendo, in Comm.
v. Huges, 133 Mass. 496, that the fact of prior convictions was "evidence" to
be considered by the jury as bearing on the question whether the accused was
guilty of the subsequent offense charged. So where the prior conviction is
faultily alleged in the indictment, evidence to support such faulty allegation is
not merely irrelevant to the other issues, but positively harmful as tending to
prejudice the jury against the defendant. Rand vz. Comm., 9 Gratt. 738.
Yet the courts agree that where a statute fixes an increased punishme.ut for
successive offenses, the prior convictions must be alleged in the indictment,
and it is not necessary that such allegations and the proof thereof be kept from
the jury till the accused has been found guilty of the later offense. Maguire
v. Mfd., 47 Md. 485.
DAMAGES-MEASURE-TROVER.--MELOON v. READ, 59 ATL. 946 (N. H.).
-Held, that in trover the measure of damages is, in general, the value of
the goods at the time of conversion.
In an action for non-delivery of goods in pursuance of a contract of sale
the vendee may be allowed, as damages, the highest value up to the time of
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trial. Kent v. Ginter, 23 Ind. x; West v. Pritchard, i9 Conn. 2M2. In stock
transactions many states allow, as damages, the highest market value between
the time of the injury and the trial. Loeb vu. Flash, 65 Ala. 526; Ellis v'.
Wire, 33 Ind. 127. In some states the highest value between the date
of the injury and the date of the bringing of the action is allowed. Cannon v.
Folsom, 2 Ia. tor. If there is undue delay in bringing the action the value at
the time of injury is the measure of damages. Chadwick v'. Butler, 28 Mich.
349; Heilbrover v. Douglass, 45 Tex. 402. Many states follow the New
York rule which fixes as the proper measure of damages, the highest market
value from the time of conversion up to a reasonable time to replace such
stock. Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211; overruling Markham v.. Jaudon, 41
N. Y. 235; Wright v'. Bank of the Metrofolis, iio N. Y. 237.
EVIDZNCF-STATEMENTS To ATTORNEY-PRIVILEGE.-KAuFMAN v. ROSEN-
SHoNE ET AL., go N. Y. SuPp. 20.-Held, that the testimony of an attorney as
'to communications made to him by his client is not admissible, whether they
relate to a suit pending, or to any other matter requiring the professional
assistance of the attorney or counsel. Van Brunt, J., dissenting.
This privilege is irrespective of litigation begun or contemplated. Green-
ough vz. Gaskell., z Myl. & K. 98; Foster v. Hall, 12 Pick. 89. Where no legal
problem has been expressly brought forward by the client, his communications
concerning the mere drafting of deeds and other instruments do not come
-within the privilege. Hoton 71. Robinson, 14 Pick 416; De Waf vt. Strader,
26 Ill. 225. The legal adviser must be admitted to practice. Barnes vt.
Harris, 7 Cush. 576; Schubkagel 71. Dierstein, 131 Pa. 46. But the rule
applies to attorney's clerks and other agents in his service. Laudsberger 71.
Gorham, 5 Cal. 450; Sibley 71. Waffle, 16 N. Y. t8o. The client's bona fide
belief that.his adviser is an admitted attorney entitles him to the privilege.
Howes 71. State, 88 Ala. 38; People v1. Barker, 6o Mich. 277. It is immaterial
whether services are gratuitous or not. Andrews 71. Simrs, 33 Ark. 771;
Davis vt. Morgan, 19 Mont. 14 r. A legal adviser may give evidence of a fact
which is patent to his senses, but not the subject of a voluntary communication.
Coveney 71. Tannahi'll, i Hill 33; Brown vt. Foster, x H. & N. 736, Contra,
Robson vt. Kempi, 5 Esp. 52. The moment confidence ceases, privilege
ceases. Parkhurst v. Lawter, 2 Swanst. 194; E-lager v1. Shindler, 29 Cal. 47.
Confidence is not presumed from mere relation of attorney and client. Peo le
it. Atkinson. 40 Cal. 284. Representative of deceased may waive the privilege
in the interest of the estate. Layman's Will, 4o Minn. 372; Brooks v. Holden,
175 Mass. 137. Contra, Westover vt. Ins. Co. ,9 N. Y. 56.
EVIDENCE-TELEGRAMS.-CGBB V. GLENN BooM & LUMBER CO., 49 S. E. zoo5
(W. VA.).-Held. that a telegram as received can be admitted only as second-
ary evidence where the telegraph company is the agent of the sender.
If the telegraph company is the agent of the sender, the message delivered
is primary evidence as against the sender. Morgan vt. Peofile, sg Ill. 58;
Trevor vt. Woods, 36 N. Y. 307. But if the receiver is the employer, the orig-
inal message given by the sender to the operator must be produced. Durkee
Vt. R. R., 29 Vt. 127. In an action for failure to deliver with diligence the de-
livered message is the original. Conyers vt. P. T. C. Co., 92 Ga. 619; West.
Union Tel. Co. v. Fatman, 73 Ala. 285. In an action for failure to transmit
message the dispatch handed to the operator is the original. West. Union
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Tel. Co. v. Hofihins, 49 Ind. 223. To prove a hiring by telegraph the dispatch
received is the original. - Wilson v. R. Co., 3I Minn. 481; Williams v.
Brichell, 37 Miss. 682. The rule that a letter following a previous one calling
for a reply should sufficiently authenticate itself by its contents does not hold
in regard to telegrams. Howley v. Whifile, 48 N. H. 487.
FORGERY-WHAT CONSTITUTES.-PEOPLE v. ABEEL, gi N. Y. Supp. 699.-
Held, that a false letter of introduction is not a forgery at common law where
it could not be considered as a means by which another could be defrauded or
by which a pecuniary liability could be created.
A writing which affects no legal rights cannot be the subject of forgery.
Waterman v'. Peoile, 67 Ill. gi. The general rule both at common law and
under statute is that an instrument to be the subject of forgery must be such
that if it were genuine it would have some apparent legal efficacy. Abbott v.
Rose, 62 Me. 194; Dixon v. State, 8i Ala. 61. It must be valid for the pur-
pose for which it purports to have been designed, Anderson v. State, 20 Tex.
App. 59s; and legally capable of affecting a fraud. Terry v. Comm., 87 Va.
672. In State v. Ames, 2 Greenl. 365 and Comm. v. Coe, 115 Mass. 48r, it is
held that a letter of recommendation or testimonial of good character is sub-
ject to forgery. Contra, Waterman v. Peofile, sufira.
INSURANCE-CONsTRUCTION OF POLICY-TECHNICALWORDS.-PETRSON V.
MODERN BROTHERHOOD OF AMERICA, ioi N. W. 289 (IowA.).-Held, that an in-
surance certificate entitling the insured to a certain benefit in case of the
breaking of a leg, and defining such breaking as "the breaking of the shaft of
the thigh bone between the hip and knee joints, or the breaking of the shafts of
both bones between the knee and ankle joints" does not cover what is known
as a "Pott's fracture," which is defined as the breaking of one bone between
the knee and ankle joints, and the dislocation of the other or, as technically de-
fined, the breaking of the fibula one and one-half to two inches above the joint
and of the malleolus process. Weaver and Bishop, JJ., dissenting.
The general rule in constructing insurance contracts is that words are to
be taken in that sense to which the apparent object and intention of the parties
limit them. Robertson v. French, 4 East 135; Rifiley v. Etna F. Ins. Co.,
3o N. Y. 136; Yeaton v. Fry, 5 Cranch 335. When a stipulation or exception
in a policy is capable of two meanings, the one most favorable to the insured
is to be adopted. May, Insurance, § 172; Western Ins. Co. v. Crofjfer, 32
Pa. 35I; Phmnix Ins. Co. v. Slaughter, 12 Wall. 404. Words are further to
be construed, not in a technical, but in a general, usual way. .May, Insur-
surance, § 175; Fire Ass'n. v. Transfb. Co., 66 Md. 339; Universal F. Ins.
Co. v. Block, io§ Pa. 535.
INSURANCE-SEVERABLE POLICY.-DONLEY v. GLENS FALLS INS. CO., 91
N. Y. SuPP. 302.-Held, that breach of warranty as to title of land on which
the insured building is located does not avoid the policy as to personalty
situated in the building. McLennan, P. J., and Storer, J., dissenting.
The general rule as to insurance of building and contents is that such
policy is not severable, and that forfeiture of the insurance as to the building
will forfeit it also as to the contents. Assur. Co. v. Stoddard, 88 Ala. 6o6;
Bank v. Ins. Co., 57 Conn. 335; Havens v. Ins. Co., xII Ind. go. In New
York, however, the later cases have fully established the rule in the principal
case. Sunderlin v. Ins. Co., x8 Hun 522; Woodward v. Ins. Co., 32 Hun
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365. The New York rule is followed in some other states. Koontz v. Ins.
Co., 42 Mo. 126; Ins. Co. v. Shreck, 27 Neb. 527. There is a conflict as to
what contracts are severable. Early cases, and the N. Y. cases allow sever-
ability where the policy is on separate and distinct classes of property, each
of which is separately valued, although the premium is paid in gross. Later
cases do not seem to follow that rule, but regard the policy as severable
where the property is so situated that the risk on each item is separate and
distinct, that on one item not affecting the risk on the others. Phenix Ins.
Co. v. Picket, ii 9 Ind. I55; Loolnis v. Ins. Co., 77 Wis. 87.
MASTER AND SERVANT-VICE PRINCIPAL.-VOGEL V. AMERICAN BRIDGE Co.,
73 N. E. I (N. Y.).-Held, that where a master put a supposedly competent
foreman in charge, with a sufficient supply of strong ropes for the work, and
a workman was injured by the breaking of an old rope which the foreman had
ordered him to use over his own protest that it was not sufficently strong, the
master was not liable. Cullen C. J., Bartlett and Vann, JJ., dissenting.
As to who is vice principal, there are two tests: the superior officer test
which prevails in Ohio and most of the states west thereof, and the non-assign-
able duty test which is more prevalent in the east. Huffcutt, Agency,338 to314,
and cases there cited. Yet the lawas to the dividing line between fellow servant
and vice principal is by no means clear, as is shown by the number of decisions
on this point made by divided courts. N. P. Ry. Co. v. Peterson, 162 U. S.
346; Murray v. S. C. Ry. Co., x McMull. 385. Especially is this true in N. Y.
Perry v. Rogers, 157 N. Y. 251; Malone v. Hathaway, 64 N. Y. 5. As a
general rule, those doing the work of a servant are fellow servants, whatever
their grade of service; and a servant, of whatever rank, charged with the per-
formance of the master's duty toward his servants, is, as to the discharge of that
duty, a vice principal. Jacgues v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 66 N.H. 482; MOyfti-
han v. Hills Co., 146 Mass. 586. As to the rule in the Federal Courts, see 14
Yale Law Journal 343.
NEGLIGENCE-ICE ON SIDEWALK-LIABILITY OF LANDLORD.-CITY OF NEw
CASTLE V. KURTZ, 59 ATL. 989 (PA.).-JHeld, that owners of property in the
possession of a tenant with properly constructed pavements in good repair,
are not liable for an injury caused by a sudden accumulation of ice thereon.
Metrezat and Potter, JJ., dissenting.
The landlord's liabilities in respect of possession are, in general,
suspended as soon as the tenant takes possession, Cheetham vz. HamfisOn, 4
T. R. 318; Mayor v. Corlies, 2 Sandf. 3o; unless he has undertaken to keep
the premises in repair and the injury is occasioned by his neglect so to do.
Leslie v. Pounds, 4 Taunt. 649. Where premises are leased with a nuisance
existing on them at the time, the landlord is liable. Irvine v. Wood, s N.
Y. 224; House v. Metcatf, 27 Conn. 631. But the landlord is not liable for a
new nuisance created by the tenant during his term, Fish v. Dodge, 4 Denio
31; Rich v. Basterfield, 4 C. B. 8o5; but if the landlord renews the lease,
knowing of the existence of the nuisance, he becomes liable. Peoile v.
Townsend, 3 Hill 479; Vedder v. Vedder, I Denio 257.
PUBLIC OFFICERS-QUORUM OF A BOARD-NOTICE TO ABSENT MEMBER.-
AKLEY V. PERRIN, 79 PAC. 192 (IDAHO.).-Hetd, that a meeting of a board of
public officers can be lawfully held by a majority of the board without giving
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notice to a member who is at the time of calling and holding the meeting beyond
the borders of the state. Stockslager, C. J., dissenting.
The decision in the present case is based on a chain of inferences and
analogies drawn from a state statute. The general rule is to the contrary.
Although an authority given to several for public purposes may be executed
by a majority of their number, Cooley v. O'Connor, 12 Wall. 39T; yet the
action of a majority cannot be upheld when the minority took no part in the
transaction, was ignorant of what was done, and gave no implied consent to
the action of the others. Schenck v. Peay, Woolw. (U. S.) 175. All must be
present to hear and consult, though a majority may decide. Peoile v. Cog-
hill, 47 Cal. 361. But if all have due notice of the time and place of meeting,
it is no objection to the validity of the action taken that not all the members
attend if there is a quorum. Wilson v. Watersville School D4LT, 46 Conn.
400; Gildersleeve v. Board of Education, 17 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 201.
RAILROADS-FIRES-NEGLIGENCE.-NO.FOLK & W. R. Co. v. FRITTS, 49 S.
E. 971 (VA.).-Held, that where it is shown that a fire was set by a locomotive,
the railroad company is presumptively guilty of negligence.
Escape of fire from a locomotive raises the presumption of negligence
against the company. R. R. Co., v,. Quaintance, 58 Ill 389; Tanner v'. N.
Y. R. Co., io8 N. Y. 623. Contra, Gandy v. R. R. Co., 30 Ia. 420;.R. R. Co. V.
Paramore, 31 nd. 143. To rebut this presumption it is necessary to show that
the locomotive was provided with the best and most approved appliances which
were properly and carefully managed. R. R. Co. v. Funk, 85 Ill. 460; Mis-
souri Pac. R. Co. v. Texas R. Co., 41 Fed. 917. The railway company is
called upon to use only "reasonable care, skill and diligence." Burroughs v.
Housatonic R. Co., z5 Conn. 124; Eddy v'. Lafayette, 49 Fed. 807. Failure to
employ the best appliances in known use is want of ordinary care and prudence.
R R. Co. v. Peninsular Land Co., 27 Fla. I; Smith v. Old Colony R. Co., zo
R. I. 22. Frequent setting out of fires raises presumption of negligence. R.R.
v. Kincaid, 29 Kan. 654. The highest and clearest evidence is not required to
rebut the presumption of negligence raised by escape of fire. Sfaulding vi.
R. R. Co., 30 Wis. 1io.
REAL PROPERTY-RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY-ADvERSE POSSESSION.-
NORTHERN PACIFIc R. Co. v. ELY, 25 SUP. CT. 3o2.-Held, that a private
person cannot obtain title to a railroad right of way by adverse possession.
Harlan, J., dissenting.
This decision follows the case of North. Pae. R. Co. v. Townsend, igo
U. S. 267, and must now be considered as the federal rule. A similar rule was
laid down in South. Pac. R. Co, v. Hyatt, 132 Cal. 240, and Collett v. Board
of Comm'rs., i19 Ind. 27. With these two exceptions, however, it is practically
universally held, both in this country and in England, that title may be ac-
quired by adverse possession to railroad property devoted to public use. Ill.
Cent. R. Co. v. Wakefield, 173 Ill. 564; Mathews v. Lake Shore R. Co., zrio
Mich. r7o; "Babbet v. Southeastern R. Co., L. R. 9 Q. B. 424. The objection
to this rule has been stated to be that corporations cannot alien property ae-
voted to public use. But, since adverse possession gives title to land without
a presumption of a grant, power to alien would seem not to be essential.
Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Stickley, x55 Ind. 312.
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REMOVAL OF CAUSES-EMINENT D OMAIN.-MADIONVILLE TRACTION CO. V.
ST. BERNARD MINING CO., 25 SUP. CT. 251.-Held, that an eminent domain
proceeding under a state statute, to be begun in a state court, is a suit of which
the Federal circuit court has original jurisdiction, where the requisite diversity
of citizenship exists, and is therefore removable to that court, when begun in
a state court. Fuller, C. J., Brewer, Peckham, and Holmes, JJ., dissenting.
Foster, 2 Fed. Prac., 8ro, states the rule that the initial proceeding in
eminent domain for appraisement by commissioners is administrative in its
nature, and therefore not removable; but where an appeal has been taken to a
court it becomes a suit, removable as such. Boom Co. v. Paterson, 98 U. S.
406; U. P. R. Co. v. Myers, 115 U. S. 1g. A petition to railroad commis-
sioners for consent to proceed to comdemn land is not a suit and is not remov-
able. N. Y., etc., R. Co. v. Cockcroft, 46 Fed. 88r. But where the proceed-
ing was originally instituted in a court and conducted as a suit, the federal
courts have held it removable. Postal Tel. Co. v. Ry. Co., 88 Fed. 803;
Sugar Creek. Co. v. McRell, 75 Fed. 34. Mandamus proceedings ate not
removable, except as they are merely ancillary. Rosenbaum v. Baner, 120
U. S. 450. State of Ind. v. R. Co., 85 Fed. I; see contra, Peoile v. R. Co.,
42 Fed. 638. Habeas corfius suits are not removable, as not involving a
money value. Kurtz v. Mo~fit, 115 U. S. 458. But quo warranto is remov-
able. Ames t. Kansas, tii U. S. 449.
TRIAL-INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY-PRESUMPTIONS.-JOHNSON V. STATE, 83 S. E.
651 (ARK.).-Held, that where the instructions are not set out in thebillof ex-
ceptions, it being only stated that no objection was made to them, the court on
appeal will presume that they were correct.
Instructions are presumed to have been correctly given to the jury by the
trial court on all questions arising in the case, if the record does not affirma-
tively show them to have been erroneous. Linton v'. Allen, 154 Mass. 432:
Vasburgh v. Yeator, 32 N. Y. 56i. And if the record contains no instructions,
it will be presumed that instructions were given, covering every branch of the
case. Richardson v. Eureka, 96 Cal. 443. When court's instructions relate to
a matter not pleaded, and to which there is no evidence, it will be presumed
that the jury made no findings on this point, and that the instructions were
therefore without prejudice. Eckelmid v'. Talbot, 8o Iowa 571. The entire
charge is presumed correct when not excepted to in the trial court. Khrow v'.
Brock, 144 Mass. 516; Kennedy v. Anderson, 98 Ind. r~i. The court will not
presume that a palpably erroneous instruction appearing on the record was a
mere mistake of the clerk who made the transcript. Stott v. Smith, 70 Ind.
298. If an instruction is capable of two interpretations and no objection is
made to it in the trial court, it will be presumed to have been based upon the
theory which would make it correct. Siebert v. Leonard, 21 Minn. 442; Erd
v. St. Paul, 22 Minn. 443. The bill of exceptions should show all the instruc-
tions on a given subject when a part is alleged to be incorrect. Oregon R.
etc., v Galliher, 2 Wash. Ter. 70.
TRIAL-RECEPTION OF VERDICT.-MORRIS V. HASBURGER, 91 N. Y. SUPP.
4og.-Held, that a judgment entered on a verdict received by the clerk, even
under the direction of the court, without objection of the parties being inter-
posed to such reception of the verdict, is void. Van Brunt, P. J., dissenting.
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The reception of the verdict is the function of the judge who presided at
the trial of the cause, and this function may not be delegated, even to the clerk
of the court. Wilet v. Porter, 42 Ind. 250; Wright v. Boon, 2 Greene 458;
Hiller v. English, 4 Strob. 486. The consent of the parties concerned cannot
authorize or legalize a change in the modes of proceeding, which the law has
prescribed for the government and direction of its legal tribunals. Balto., etc.,
R. R. CO. v . Polly, 14 Gratt. 447; Britton v. Fox, 39 Ind. 369. Some few
courts have declared that the proceedings appertaining to the reception of the
verdict are mere matters of practice, and are for the courts to regulate in the
exercise of a reasonable discretion. But this is only in civil causes. Sowelle
-u. Craig, 9 Ala. 534; Wright v'. Hemfihill, 8i N. C. 33; Willoughby V'.
Threadgill, 72 N. C. 438.
